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Abstract
Family unity is not considered a right within international 
refugee instruments and as a result the laws and poli-
cies of most states are silent in this regard. Family unity 
is however a legal concept which is addressed extensively 
in various other international law instruments. Th is paper 
contends that refugee law as a dynamic body of law is 
informed by these international law instruments and it 
should not be viewed as an isolated body of law and be 
denied the benefi ts there from. Th e right of family unity is 
oft en distinguished from the right to family reunifi cation, 
which extends protection more specifi cally to families that 
have been separated that wish to reunite. Even though few 
human rights instruments specifi cally designate a right of 
family reunifi cation it will be argued that to deny family 
reunifi cation is to eff ectively violate the right to family 
unity. Th is paper furthermore examines the right to family 
reunifi cation as it applies to refugees, looking specifi cally 
at the current status of South African and international 
law. It will be emphasised that because refugee law is 
informed by international human rights law, it can sup-
port, reinforce or supplement refugee law.
Résumé
L’unité familiale n’est pas considérée comme un droit au 
sein des politiques et outils internationaux concernant 
les réfugiés, et en conséquence, les lois et politiques de la 
plupart des États n’en font pas mention. Pourtant, l’unité 
familiale est un concept juridique dûment traité dans les 
autres politiques et outils du droit international. Cet arti-
cle soutient que la loi sur les réfugiés, en tant que corpus 
dynamique de lois, est organiquement lié aux autres lois 
et politiques internationales, et qu’elle ne devrait pas être 
privée de leurs aspects positifs, en étant traitée comme un 
corpus isolé de lois. Le droit à l’unité familiale est parfois 
distingué du droit à la réunifi cation familiale, qui étend sa 
protection principalement aux familles qui ont été séparées 
et qui souhaitent se réunir. Bien que quelques instruments 
juridiques du droit de la personne mentionnent spécifi que-
ment le droit à la réunifi cation familiale, nous soutenons 
que nier ce droit revient en réalité à violer le droit à l’unité 
familiale. Cet article examine le droit à la réunifi cation 
familiale et comment il s’applique pour les réfugiés, et en 
particulier dans le cas de l’Afrique du Sud et du droit inter-
national. L’article souligne que les lois internationales sur 
les droits de la personne, parce qu’elles sous-tendent la loi 
sur les réfugiés, peut en fait soutenir, renforcer et compléter 
cette dernière.
Introduction
Th e refugee experience is such that it is common for family 
members to be separated from each other before or during 
their fl ight from their state of origin. In the face of persecu-
tion, families adopt strategies, some of which may necessi-
tate temporary separation: sending a politically active adult 
into hiding, helping a son escape forcible recruitment by 
militia forces or sending abroad a woman at risk of attack or 
abduction1. Family members may be forced to take diff erent 
routes out of the country or to leave at diff erent times as 
opportunities permit. It is also common for refugees to be 
unaware, oft en for long periods, whether a family member 
is alive or dead. Th e commonality of the experience does 
not in any way detract from the pain and anxiety felt by 
those separated from close family members.
Refugees oft en go to great lengths to fi nd lost relatives 
and fi nding a way to be reunited with them can easily 
assume paramount importance in a refugee’s life. Jastram 
states that whether the separation is a ‘chosen strategy or an 
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unintended consequence of the chaos of forcible displace-
ment,’2 the separation of a refugee family is rarely intended 
to be permanent.
Unfortunately family unity is not considered a right 
within international refugee documents and as a result the 
laws and policies of most countries are silent in this regard.
Family unity is however a legal concept which is 
addressed extensively in various international law docu-
ments and even though there is no specifi c provision in the 
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees3 (hereinaft er the “1951 Convention”) and its 1967 
Protocol4, refugee law, as a dynamic body of law, is informed 
by these international law documents. Since refugee law is 
informed by these international law documents it should 
not be viewed as an isolated body of law and be denied the 
benefi ts there from.
Family unity in the refugee context means granting 
refugee status or a similar secure status to family members 
accompanying a recognised refugee. Th e country of asylum 
must likewise provide for family reunifi cation since the 
refugee cannot by defi nition return to the state of origin to 
enjoy reunifi cation there. To facilitate reunifi cation imposes 
an obligation on the state and whilst it is clear that states 
may not arbitrarily interfere with existing family unity it 
is less clear whether a state should be obligated to facilitate 
family reunifi cation aft er family members have involuntar-
ily separated from one another.
Th e United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(hereinaft er “the UNHCR”),5 and many states consider 
family reunifi cation a cornerstone of eff ective refugee pro-
tection. Regrettably, the circumstances of war and perse-
cution that fragment refugee families are oft en followed 
by administrative and policy restrictions by countries of 
asylum that prolong the separation of families. Th is separa-
tion and trauma has been found to exacerbate the depres-
sion and trauma6 experienced by refugees and it further-
more impedes the successful establishment and integration 
of those in asylum states. In addition, family members left  
behind may be targeted for direct persecution as a result 
of their relation to the refugee7 diminishing protection for 
those who are left  behind in states of origin.
Th is paper examines the right to family reunifi cation as it 
applies to refugees, looking specifi cally at the current status 
of South African and international law. It will be empha-
sised that because refugee law is informed by international 
human rights law, it can support, reinforce or supplement 
refugee law. Th e right of family unity is oft en distinguished 
from the right to family reunifi cation, which extends protec-
tion more specifi cally to families that have been separated 
that wish to reunite. Even though few human rights instru-
ments specifi cally designate a right of family reunifi cation, 
it will be argued that to deny family reunifi cation is to 
eff ectively violate the right to family unity.
Some practical impediments facing refugees who have 
become separated from their families will additionally be 
highlighted and a specifi c analysis of a child’s unqualifi ed 
right to be united with family will be undertaken.
Given the increasingly restrictive migration policies of 
states, family reunifi cation is becoming progressively more 
diffi  cult; the need for new ideas and approaches is thus more 
compelling. In view of the fact that the concept of family 
unity has been visited in South African case-law, a new 
approach is required in the refugee context as the Refugees 
Act of South Africa8 is silent on the issue.
Th e Right to Family Unity in International Law
Th e right to family unity is entrenched in universal and 
regional human rights instruments and international 
humanitarian law. Even though there is no specifi c provi-
sion in the 1951 Convention, refugee law as a dynamic body 
of law, is informed by international human rights law and 
humanitarian law. In addition, several UNHCR Executive 
Committee conclusions reaffi  rm the state’s obligation to 
take measures which promote and respect the unity of a 
family and family reunifi cation.
Th e 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol—Not an 
Isolated Body of Law
Hathaway9 endorses the view that the Refugee Convention 
and its Protocol are part and parcel of international human 
rights law and not an aspect of immigration or migration. 
His view is fully in line with the position adopted by several 
foreign superior courts which have analysed the object and 
purpose of the Refugee Convention and its Protocol. In this 
regard, the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney-
General) v Ward10 expressed the view that:
Th e essential purpose of the Refugee Convention is to identify 
persons who no longer enjoy the most basic forms of protection 
states are obliged to provide. In such circumstances refugee law 
provides a substitute protection of basic human rights.11
Similarly, the High Court of Australia in Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Aff airs v. Khawar12 has 
linked refugee law more directly to international human 
rights law when it stated:
… [Th e Refugee Convention’s] meaning should be ascertained 
having regard to its object, bearing in mind that the Convention is 
one of several important international treaties designed to redress 
violation[s] of basic human rights, demonstrative of the failure 
of state protection… . It is the recognition of the failure of state 
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protection , so oft en repeated in the history of the past hundred 
years , that led to the exceptional involvement of international law 
in matters concerning human rights.13
Furthermore, in Applicant ‘A’ and Ano’r v. Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Aff airs,14 the Australian 
court held that:
Th e term refugee is to be understood as written against the back-
ground of international human rights law, including as refl ected 
or expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights15 
(especially Articles 3,5 and 16) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights16 (especially Article 23).17
Despite the foregoing, many governments are imple-
menting increasingly restrictive asylum policies to deter and 
prevent asylum seekers from seeking refuge on their terri-
tory. Manifestations of this trend includes several measures 
such as visa control, safe fi rst country arrangements, stricter 
interpretations of the refugee defi nition as well as restricted 
family reunifi cation rights.18 Governments have tended to 
justify such policies in light of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
provisions, without further reference or regard to other 
applicable human rights and humanitarian instruments.
According to the general rule of interpretation of treat-
ies,19 treaties must be interpreted in their context and in 
light of their object and purpose. Refugee protection has 
its origins in general principles of human rights and in the 
refugee law context, it is generally agreed that norms of pro-
tection are framed within a human rights context.
Th e preamble20 to the 1951 Convention invokes the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights21 as the means by 
which States ‘have affi  rmed the principle that human beings 
shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without dis-
crimination.’ Th is reference confi rms that international 
refugee law was not intended to be seen in isolation. Th e 
inclusion of ‘the right to seek and to enjoy asylum from 
persecution’ in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights places international refugee law squarely 
within the human rights paradigm.22
To be able to determine the applicable standard of the 
refugee’s right to family unity and the concomitant right to 
family reunifi cation the inter-relationship between inter-
national and regional human rights law and refugee law 
needs to be better explored. In this regard, the following 
questions will be examined in this paper:
[1] Which standard should be applied in the event of a 
clash between the diff erent bodies of law?;
[2] Which standard takes precedence where the 1951 
Convention is either silent, as to the appropriate 
treatment, or off ers a lower standard than inter-
national human rights law?; and
[3] Does the higher standard apply?23
Th e Right to Family Life Under International 
Human Rights Law
Th ere are a number of provisions that elaborate on the right 
to family life under international human rights law. Th e 
objective, however, is to ascertain what obligations human 
rights instruments place on states to protect family unity 
and whether these obligations extend to imposing a positive 
obligation on states.
To begin, Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provides that ‘the family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to pro-
tection by society and the state.’ Th e right to family is a 
fundamental human right and Article 16 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights clearly establishes this right 
for all peoples, regardless of status.
Protection of the family as the natural and fundamen-
tal group unit of society is also confi rmed in the ICCPR, 
at Articles 17 and 23.24 Article 17 of the ICCPR prohibits 
the unlawful and arbitrary interference with families and 
Article 23 states that the family is the natural and funda-
mental unit of society entitled to protection from the state. 
Whereas Article 17 can be read narrowly as simply provid-
ing a basis for the right to family unity, Article 23 allows far 
more as outlined by Comment 19 of the UN Offi  ce of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, which states that 
“the right to found a family implies, in principle the possi-
bility to procreate and live together.”25 Th is further implies 
that appropriate measures must be adopted to ensure the 
unity or reunifi cation of families.
Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights26 (hereinaft er the “ICESCR”), 
confi rms an obligation on states to ensure the “widest pos-
sible protection and assistance” to families. “Protection and 
assistance” suggests an obligation that goes further than 
“refrain from interference.” states will have to go further and 
adopt measures to “protect and assist”. Th is is benefi cial 
in the refugee context where, at times, unity can only take 
place through reunifi cation in the asylum state.
Th e 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol
Article 527 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides that 
nothing in the Convention shall impair any right or benefi ts 
granted to refugees apart from the Convention. Hence, since 
the right to family unity and reunifi cation has developed in 
international law, it cannot be limited by provisions or lack 
thereof in refugee law. As stated above, the right to family 
unity applies to all human beings, regardless of their status. 
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According to Hathaway, a broader perspective than that of 
the 1951 Convention is therefore necessary to understand-
ing the scope of the right to family unity for refugees.28 Th e 
absence from the 1951 Convention of a specifi c provision 
relating to family unity does not mean that the draft ers 
failed to see protection of the refugee family as an obliga-
tion. Hathaway argues that the 1951 Convention indeed 
provides protection for the refugee family in a number of 
its Articles.29
Recommendation B
In addition to the Preamble of the 1951 Convention, refu-
gees’ essential right to family unity was also the subject of a 
recommendation approved unanimously by the Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries that adopted the full fi nal text of the 
Convention. It states:
Considering that the unity of the family, the natural and the fun-
damental group unit of society, is an essential right of the refugee, 
and that such unity is constantly threatened, and
Noting with satisfaction that, according to the offi  cial commentary 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 
the rights granted to a refugee are extended to the members of 
his family,
Recommends Governments to take the necessary measures for 
the protection of the refugee’s family, especially with a view to: 
(1) Ensuring that the unity of the refugee’s family is maintained 
particularly in cases where the head of the family has fulfi lled the 
necessary conditions for admission to a particular country: (2) 
the protection of refugees who are minor, in particular unaccom-
panied children and girls, with special reference to guardianship 
and adoption [Italics added]30
Hathaway31 states that while the recommendation is non-
binding, its characterisation of family unity as an “essen-
tial right” is evidence of the draft ers’ object and purpose in 
formulating the 1951 Refugee Convention.32 He states fur-
ther that UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions have 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of state action to 
maintain or re-establish refugee family unity.33
Th e UNHCR Handbook
Th e above mentioned recommendation is reproduced and 
elaborated in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (hereinaft er the 
“Handbook”).34 More specifi cally, paragraph 181 of the 
Handbook refers to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which states that the family is the natural and fun-
damental group unit of society and therefore entitled to 
protection.35 Paragraph 182 restates Recommendation B 
and paragraph 183 notes that regardless of whether or not 
states are party to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol 
the principle of family unity is observed by a majority of 
states giving it the status of opinio juris.
Paragraph 184 of the Handbook refers to the practice by 
some states of granting refugee status to the dependants of 
the refugee heads of households, her or his dependants are 
normally granted refugee status accordingly to the princi-
ple of family unity where the minimum requirement to be a 
dependant would include a spouse and the minor children.
Hathaway36 further confi rms that although an explicit 
right to family unity in the refugee context is not found in 
the 1951 Convention itself, the 1951 Refugee Convention 
must be understood in light of subsequent developments 
in international law, including international treaties and 
agreements, state practice and opinio juris.37
International Jurisprudence
Th ere is no uniformity in international jurisprudence 
largely because there is no specifi c mention of the refugee’s 
family in the defi nition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention. 
Notwithstanding that the status of a refugee’s family mem-
ber was considered by the Ad Hoc Committee that draft ed 
the 1951 Convention. Th e Committee said that ‘members 
of the immediate family of a refugee should, in general, be 
considered as refugees if the head of the family is a refugee 
as here defi ned. ’38
In many states that are party to the 1951 Convention, 
there is long standing jurisprudence affi  rming the principle 
of family unity. For example, in the case of Tshisuaka and 
Tshilele v. Belgium,39 the 3rd Chamber of the Belgian Conseil 
d’état refused to expel the spouse of a Congolese asylum 
seeker from Belgium on the grounds of family unity.
However, according to the Australian perspective, the 
absence of any provision relating to family unity or family 
reunifi cation in the 1951 Convention suggests that the 
founders were not prepared to accept unconditional obliga-
tions relating to the families of refugees. According to the 
Australians, the 1951 Convention’s founders regarded these 
issues as ultimately a matter for the judgment of the country 
of refuge, to be determined mainly by national asylum and 
immigration law and policies relating to admission criteria 
within the framework of international law.40
Th e view of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Sale v Haitian Centers Council41 and the House of Lords in 
the UK in T v Home Secretary42 is that decisions to admit 
persons as refugees to the territory of member states are left  
to those states.
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Regional Instruments: African Standard
Human rights standards in the context of Africa are 
enshrined in the 1969 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights.43 Of importance is that this Charter cov-
ers economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and 
political rights. Specifi c mention is made of the family in 
Article 18 stating that the family is the natural unit of soci-
ety and as such should be protected by the state.44
Also of note is Article 23 of the 1990 African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child45 extending state 
obligation to include specifi c protection for refugee chil-
dren. In addition it reaffi  rms the importance of family 
unity and obliges states to undertake eff orts aimed at family 
reunifi cation.46
Th e 1969 Convention Governing the Specifi c Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa,47 (hereinaft er the “OAU 
Convention”) is of utmost importance in terms of refugee 
protection in Africa. Th is Convention must be viewed in 
relation to human rights instruments such as the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, mentioned above.
Th e draft ers of the OAU Convention sought to comple-
ment rather than replace the 1951 Convention. Th is is 
refl ected in Articles 9 and 10 of the Preamble,48 which stress 
that the 1951 Convention constitutes the basic and univer-
sal instrument relating to the status of refugees. Cognisant 
of the political climate in which the 1951 Convention was 
draft ed, the draft ers of the OAU Convention sought to de-
politicise the issue of refugee crises as well as the concept of 
asylum. Th is is refl ected in Article 2(2), which states that the 
“grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian 
act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any 
Member State.”49 Moreover, Article 2(6) states that for rea-
sons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, 
settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of 
their country of origin. Th is provision was intended to dis-
courage the setting up of refugee camps on borders, thereby 
increasing tensions and friction between the sending and 
receiving states.
Family Reunifi cation and International Law
Family Reunifi cation distinguished from Family Unity
Th e right of unity is oft en distinguished from the right to 
reunifi cation, which extends protection more specifi cally 
to families which have been separated and wish to reunite. 
Many refugees are forced to leave family members behind in 
their country of origin and to then seek reunifi cation once 
granted refugee status in the asylum state. In the context 
of International Refugee Law, the right to family reunifi ca-
tion may be qualifi ed primarily because it intersects with 
the right of sovereign states to control the entry of non-
nationals into their territory but it is not entirely defi ned 
thereby.50 Given that the right to family unity is established 
in International Human Rights Law and international law, 
and therefore applies to all human beings regardless of cit-
izenship or status, provisions, or lack thereof within inter-
national refugee law, cannot limit its scope.51
Th e right to family unity is inherent in the right to family 
life.52 As it is so common in the refugee experience for 
family members to be separated from each other before or 
during their fl ight from the country of origin, for refugees, 
the right to family unity implies a right to family reunifi ca-
tion in the country of asylum. More specifi cally, the refugee 
cannot return to his or her country of origin to enjoy the 
right to family unity there.
Th e right to marriage and family as established within 
International Human Rights Law entails contrasting obli-
gations on states. On the one hand, states are obliged to 
refrain from taking action that disrupts families and it is 
now widely recognised that states must take positive steps 
to reunite families if they have been separated especially if 
they are unable to reunite elsewhere.53
Indeed, the 1951 Convention does not incorporate the 
principle of family unity. Nevertheless, UNHCR notes that 
most states respect the principle and that a failure to allow 
for family reunifi cation and thereby for family unity, is inter-
preted as a violation of the right as opposed to evidence that 
the right does not exist. In this regard, the UNHCR states 
that the “ … [r]efusal to allow family reunifi cation may be 
considered as an interference with the right to family life or 
to family unity, especially where the family has no realistic 
possibilities of enjoying the right elsewhere.”54
Few international human rights instruments specifi cally 
deal with the right to family reunifi cation, among these, the 
1975 Helsinki Declaration.55 Although this Declaration is 
not binding as it does not have treaty status, it is persuasive 
in that is demonstrates the participant parties’ intentions.
Anderfuhren-Wayne56 notes that at least among some 
industrialised states, there is a policy of allowing admis-
sion of persons who have been separated from their families, 
where reasonable, noting that states are under a political 
and moral obligation to conduct their immigration poli-
cies so as to avoid unnecessary disruption to family life.57 
It can be argued that refusal to allow family reunifi cation 
may be considered interference to the right to family unity 
especially where there is no realistic possibility of the family 
enjoying that right elsewhere. States should facilitate admis-
sion to their territories, at least where it would be unreason-
able to expect the families to be reunited elsewhere.
Th e Elsewhere Approach
Th e Elsewhere Approach was largely developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights.58 It is an approach 
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which off ers support to the plight of refugee families 
because, more oft en than not, refugees cannot be reunited 
elsewhere but in the country of reception. According to 
the Elsewhere Approach, expulsion or exclusion of a family 
member is legitimate if other family members can follow 
and if this can be reasonably expected of them. A determin-
ation of reasonableness involves weighing the advantages 
and disadvantages to the concerned individual against the 
interest of the state served by its immigration policy. Th e 
determining criteria adopted by the European Court for 
Human Rights include amongst others:
• Consideration of one’s ties with the state denying 
entry;
• Links with the foreign country;
• Th e economic consequences of moving to another 
country;
Th e European Court of Human Rights has decided in two 
non-refugee cases that a state must allow family reunifi -
cation if it is the only way for a family to achieve family 
unity.59
Whilst the Gul case60 appears to be a narrowing of the 
right to family reunifi cation because the applicants could 
reunite elsewhere—they were not allowed to reunite in 
Switzerland in this case—the decision bodes well for refu-
gee family reunifi cation. Th e facts of the case were as follows. 
Th e applicant, Mr. Gul, had arrived in Switzerland seeking 
asylum as he feared political persecution in Turkey due to his 
membership of a party opposed to the government’s actions 
in South East Turkey. However, once granted a humanitar-
ian permit, he dropped his claim for asylum status. His wife 
who suff ered from epilepsy was allowed to join him three 
years later for humanitarian reasons. Th e applicants sought 
to be reunited with their son on the basis that it was impos-
sible for them to return to their son. Th e government argued 
that it was possible for them to return to Turkey and reunite 
with their son and therefore Switzerland had no obligation 
to allow family reunion in Switzerland.
Although the above approach has largely been used in 
terms of immigration matters, in the European Union, its 
applicability and value to refugee matters is signifi cant. 
Firstly, the refugee family would only request reunifi cation 
of a family member if it has established itself in the receiv-
ing state. Secondly, it would have nowhere else to go and 
by the very defi nition of a refugee, it could not back to its 
country of origin, unless resettlement to a third country is 
an option.
Th e Humanitarian Approach
Th ere are various international resolutions stressing the 
importance of reunifi cation in connection with the princi-
ple of family unity. Th e Fourth Geneva Convention of 194961 
devoted considerable attention to the problems of families 
dispersed owing to war. In addition to provisions aimed at 
maintaining family unity during a wartime evacuation, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention provides for mechanisms such 
as family messages, tracing of family members, and regis-
tration of children to enable family communication and if 
possible family reunifi cation.
Furthermore, in 1981, the UNHCR Executive Committee 
concluded, with regard to family reunifi cation and refugees, 
as follows:
In the application of the principle of the unity of the family and 
for obvious humanitarian reasons, every eff ort should be made to 
ensure the reunifi cation of separated families. It is hoped that the 
countries of asylum will apply liberal criteria in identifying those 
family members who can be admitted with a view to promoting a 
comprehensive reunifi cation of the family.62
Similarly, the conclusions of the Th irteenth Round Table 
of the Institute of Humanitarian Law have stressed reunifi -
cation in connection with unity:
Th e humanitarian principle of family reunifi cation is fi rmly estab-
lished in international practice … Th is principle is closely linked 
to the right of the unity of the family which recognises that the 
family is the natural and the fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the state… . [T]here 
exists diff erent situations where families need to be reunited ,solu-
tions must be reached in accordance with relevant international 
law and the requirements of the particular situation.63
For many years, the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement has played a major role in preserv-
ing family unity and integrity, particularly in facilitating 
the reunifi cation of families dispersed by war or as a con-
sequence of persecution. Various resolutions of the move-
ment’s international conferences encourage national soci-
eties, governments and international bodies to facilitate 
family reunifi cation.
Family reunifi cation oft en begins with the tracing of 
separated family members. Recommendations of the 26th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement state that national societies should:
… [m]aximise their effi  ciency in carrying out tracing work and 
family reunifi cation by strengthening their tracing and social 
welfare activities and maintaining close cooperation with the 
ICRC and government authorities and other competent organi-
sations such as the UNHCR the International Organisation of 
Migration.64
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Family reunifi cation should therefore be considered as a 
means of implementing the principle of family unity. If a 
right should be recognised by states concerning the reunion 
of the family, it is more a right to enter and live in the receiv-
ing state or a right to the protection of the family unit rather 
than a right to family reunifi cation.
From the above it is apparent that there is no lack of 
international standards regarding the principle of family 
unity, rather the issue is with their implementation being 
hampered by administrative restrictions.
Th e Child’s Right to Family Reunifi cation in International 
Law
Th e Convention on the Rights of the Child65 appears to pro-
vide the most holistic and assertive pronouncement on the 
right to family reunifi cation.
In recent years there has been recognition that unaccom-
panied and separated children are particularly vulnerable 
and that states face various challenges in providing such 
children access and enjoyment of their rights. A General 
Comment66 was issued in 2005 motivated by the UN 
Committee of the Rights of the Child’s observance of an 
increasing number of children in such situations. Th ere are 
varied and numerous reasons for children being unaccom-
panied67 or separated,68 ranging from persecution of the 
child or the parents; to international confl ict and civil war 
to traffi  cking in various contexts and forms, certainly the 
number of unaccompanied or separated children are a 
growing cause of concern within the refugee sphere.
Th e right to family reunifi cation for minor children and 
their parents is codifi ed in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child at Article 10:
In accordance with the obligations of States Parties under article 9, 
paragraph 1 [a child shall not be separated from his or her parents 
against their will], applications by a child or his or her parents to 
enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunifi ca-
tion shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, humane and 
expeditious manner.69
Several elements of this provision are noteworthy:
• First, the explicit link to the Convention of the Rights 
of the Child in Article 9 means that the obligation 
there imposed to ensure the unity of families within 
the state also determines the states’ actions regarding 
families divided by borders.
• Second, one of the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child’s achievements is the recognition that reunifi -
cation may require a state to allow entry as well as 
departure.
• Th ird, children and parents have equal status in a 
mutual right; either may be entitled to join the other. 
It is not suffi  cient that the child be with only one par-
ent in an otherwise previously intact family; the child 
has the right to be with both parents, and both parents 
have the right and responsibility to raise the child.
• Fourth, the obligation on states to deal with reunifi -
cation requests in a ‘positive’ and ‘humane’ manner 
means, in most cases, an affi  rmative manner.
• Lastly, that parties shall cooperate with the United 
Nations to protect and assist a refugee child and to 
trace the parents or other members of the family of the 
refugee child in order to obtain information necessary 
for reunifi cation with his or her family.
While Article 10 does not expressly mandate approval of 
every family reunifi cation application,70 it clearly con-
templates that there is at least a presumption in favour of 
approval.71 Th e formulation of Article 10 is considerably 
strongly worded and does not allow much room for sig-
nifi cant state discretion, such as ‘consider favourably,’ ‘take 
appropriate measures,’ or ‘in accordance with national law.’ 
Anderwuhren-Wayne72 asserts that states enjoy extensive 
discretion but she does not identify the basis for this dis-
cretion. States cannot maintain generally restrictive laws 
or practices regarding the entry of aliens for reunifi cation 
purposes without violating the Convention of the Rights of 
the Child.73
Goodwin-Gill asserts that reservations made by a small 
number of states to the reunifi cation provision provide 
additional confi rmation that the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child indeed imposes a general duty to allow entry 
for family reunifi cation purposes.74 While it may be argued 
that state practice is not uniform, outright failures to allow 
reunifi cation are more properly seen as violations of the 
right, not as evidence that there is no right.75
As with the right to family unity, experts are almost uni-
versally in agreement that there is at present a right under 
international law to family reunifi cation.76 It has been char-
acterized as a self-evident corollary to the right to family 
unity77 and the right to found a family78 and has been 
linked to freedom of movement.
In sum, it is now widely recognized that a state is obliged 
to reunite close family members of a non-citizen on its ter-
ritory if they are unable to enjoy the right to family unity in 
their own country, or elsewhere.
South African Refugee Law
Th e Refugees Act of South Africa79 refl ects the principles 
contained in various international instruments dealing 
with refugees.80 Th e 1951 Refugee Convention specifi c-
ally obliges state parties to grant refugees either the same 
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treatment as nationals of that state or, as a minimum, ‘the 
most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign 
country in the same circumstances’81 in respect of a variety 
of diff erent rights. Th e OAU Convention is less specifi c, but 
does commit member states to“ … [u]se their best endeav-
ours consistent with their respective legislations to receive 
refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, 
for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return 
to their country of origin or nationality.”82
Both Conventions state that their provisions shall be 
applied without discrimination.83 All persons in South 
Africa share a certain set of basic human rights under 
international law, regardless of their immigration status. 
Refugees have, in addition, rights based on international 
refugee law and the principle of non-refoulement, that per-
sons should not be returned to a country where they fear 
persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opin-
ion, or which they were compelled to leave owing to exter-
nal aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order.
An Analysis of the Refugees Act (130 of 1998)
Th e Refugees Act in its preamble84 refers to South Africa’s 
acceptance of its obligations under international law and the 
“other human rights instruments” to which it is a party. Th e 
Act refers specifi cally to South Africa acceding to the 1951 
Convention and the OAU Convention. In addition, in a sub-
stantive section of the Refugees Act, at section 6,85 an inter-
pretation in terms of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and any other international agreement to which 
South Africa is a party is demanded thus clearly paving the 
way for a human rights interpretation of the Refugees Act. 
On the issue of family unity and family reunifi cation, as dis-
cussed above, the human rights approach is the preferred 
approach if the domestic law is silent as is the case with the 
South African Refugees Act.
Benefi cial to refugees generally and with regard to 
family unity in particular is the fact that the South African 
Refugees Act provides a more extensive defi nition of a 
refugee, than both the 1951 Convention and the OAU 
Convention; it includes dependants of recognized refugees 
as being refugees themselves.86 South Africa thus aff ords 
derivative status to the dependant, which automatically 
includes immediate family members of the recognised refu-
gee. Th is provision recognizes that not all members of a 
family necessarily have refugee claims; and it furthermore 
respects the family as a unit. Th is is the preferred approach 
in the light of the fact that the granting of refugee status is 
meant to be a form of surrogate protection. Th e host coun-
try should strive to provide protection to the refugee not 
just by physically protecting him or her from persecution, 
which would be minimum protection, but also so that he or 
she may live in dignity.
Nowhere in the Refugees Act does it stipulate that a 
dependant or a family member must be present in South 
Africa at the time of status determination of the principal 
applicant. Th ere is therefore nothing in the Act which bars 
a claimant to seek derivative status even if the claimant 
arrives at a date later than the principal refugee.
Th e defi nition of dependant in section 1 of the Refugees 
Act includes, “spouse, any unmarried dependent child or 
destitute, aged or infi rm member of the family of the refu-
gee or asylum seeker.” 87 While there is not enough clarity 
of who is considered a member of the family, this is already 
recognition that the family is more than what is generally 
considered a nuclear family. Th e concept of what constitutes 
a family varies from state to state, and in some circum-
stances, within regions of a state. Th e absence of an agreed 
defi nition has meant that states may defi ne the term accord-
ing to their own interest, culture and system.88
Th ere is no universally accepted defi nition of the family, 
and international law recognizes a variety of forms;89 more 
specifi cally, that a family consists of those who consider 
themselves and are considered by each other to be part of 
the family, and who wish to live together.90 In the refugee 
context, states have shown a willingness to promote “liberal 
criteria” with a view toward “comprehensive reunifi cation” 
of families.91 Given the range of variations on the notion of 
family, a fl exible approach is needed.92
Th e Refugees Act provides that refugees in South Africa 
are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights93 of the 
South African Constitution.94 Since refugees are aff orded 
the same rights as South Africans a broader defi nition of 
who is family should be considered in light of the fact that 
South Africa’s Customary Marriages Act95 has accepted 
a broader defi nition of family than the nuclear family. In 
this regard, polygamous marriages and their off spring are 
already considered legitimate in terms South African law.
Th e Constitution also gives eff ect to customary law, 
which allows for a broader defi nition of family. Th e South 
African Constitutional Court has affi  rmed the following in 
this regard:
Th ese stereotypical and stunted notions of marriage and family 
must now succumb to the newfound and restored values of our 
society, its institutions and diverse people. Th ey must yield to 
societal and constitutional recognition of expanding frontiers of 
family life and intimate relationships. Our Constitution guaran-
tees not only dignity and equality but also freedom of religion and 
belief. What is more, s 15(3) 100 of the Constitution foreshadows 
and authorises legislation that recognises marriages concluded 
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under any tradition or a system of religious, personal or family 
law.96
South Africa’s broader defi nition of a family is indeed a 
more realistic and more inclusive way of defi ning a family 
as it takes account the diversity of peoples and the evolving 
nature of the family. Th is defi nition should be thus adopted 
in any approach that South Africa formulates in terms of 
family reunifi cation.
Th e Principle of Family Unity and South African Law
Except for Section 28 of the South African Constitution,97 
which describes a child’s right to family care, there is no 
specifi c right to family in the Constitution or any other stat-
ute in South Africa.
However, in a ground breaking judgment, Dawood v. 
Minister of Home Aff airs98 the Cape High Court held that 
the right to dignity must be interpreted to aff ord protec-
tion to the institutions of marriage and family life. Th e 
Constitutional Court thereaft er confi rmed the approach 
and held that the Constitution indeed protected the rights 
of persons to freely marry and raise a family. Th e court 
stated that:
Section 25(9)(b) of the [Aliens Control] Act also fell foul of the 
right to human dignity protected in s 10 of the Constitution, both 
of South African permanent residents who were married to alien 
non-resident spouses, as also of such alien spouses. Th e practical 
eff ect of s 25(9)(b) was that, although an alien spouse married to 
a South African permanent resident was in fact living in South 
Africa with her or his spouse, the alien spouse could be compelled 
to leave South Africa and to remain outside the country while her 
or his application for an immigration permit was being submitted 
to and considered by the relevant regional committee. Th is would 
result in a violation of the core element of the alien spouse’s right 
to family life and thus a violation of her or his right to human dig-
nity. Accordingly, s 25(9)(b) also constituted an infringement or a 
threatened infringement of the South African permanent resident 
spouse’s right to human dignity.99 [emphasis included]
Even though the Refugees Act is silent with regards to 
family reunifi cation, in terms of the Dawood judgment it 
may not be necessary for refugees to invoke international 
instruments100 for the reason that in terms of the South 
African Bill of Rights, once inside South Africa, foreign 
nationals are entitled to the same rights available to “every-
one”101 in the Republic except those that are specifi cally set 
aside for citizens such as the right to vote or hold public 
offi  ce. Th is together with the importance of family unity 
places an obligation on South Africa to allow for the reunifi -
cation of refugee families within South Africa.
Practical Impediments
Whilst there is ample evidence of a right to family reunifi ca-
tion for refugees in international law and an even stronger 
case in South African domestic law, there remain many 
practical impediments to actual family reunifi cation in 
South Africa.
Firstly, the Refugees Act at Section 33 only refers to 
dependants of recognized refugees and their rights and 
obligations in the Republic. Secondly, the Act does not pre-
scribe a method for bringing dependants of refugees across 
South Africa’s borders. Th ere is no existing policy or imple-
mentation procedure developed by the government even 
though arguably the right to family unity and the concomi-
tant right to family reunifi cation exist in principle for refu-
gees in South Africa.
When the Family Member is Present in South Africa
Th e administrative process to join a spouse or a dependant of 
a refugee to a main applicant’s asylum application fi le at the 
Department of Home Aff airs102 has in the past not proved 
to be so problematic.103 Th e application would be made in 
terms of Section 3(c) of the Refugees Act, and the refugee 
would present him or herself to the refugee reception offi  ce 
and request family joining with a specifi c member or mem-
bers of his or her family seeking asylum. In addition to the 
principal applicant having had to declare his or her spouse 
and children in the initial asylum application form, the 
applicant would also have to supply documentary evidence 
of the relationship with the family member, such as mar-
riage certifi cate, birth certifi cate, evidence of cohabitation, 
or any documentary evidence to prove a relationship issued 
by the relevant authority of the country of origin such as 
identity documents.104
As the refugee regime in South Africa has matured, more 
impediments to the smooth joining process of spouses or 
dependants of refugees, who arrive on their own to join their 
family members, is becoming evident.105 Unfortunately, 
due to the fact that no specifi c family joining system is in 
place in South Africa for refugees, Department of Home 
Aff airs offi  cials oft en refuse a family member’s application 
on the basis of a more restrictive reading of the Refugees 
Act, in particular that of Regulation 16, which states that “ … 
[d]ependants who accompanied the asylum applicant to the 
Republic may apply for refugee status pursuant to section 
3(c) of the Act [emphasis added].”106
A broader, human-rights approach interpretation of the 
Refugees Act on this point should allow for any dependant 
or spouse to get derivative status, no matter whether they 
arrive at a later date, aft er the principal applicant applied 
for asylum. Th e refugee defi nition in the Act itself makes no 
distinction whatsoever in Section 3(c) between a dependant 
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who accompanies the main applicant upon making the 
application or who arrives at a later date.
When the Family Member is Present in the Country of 
Origin or a Th ird Country
In South Africa, for a refugee to be able to facilitate reunifi -
cation with his or her immediate family members outside 
of the country will require an amendment to legislation, 
despite as shown above, the fact that the right to family 
unity and the concomitant right to reunifi cation can be 
argued to exist in South Africa.
In South Africa, family unity concerns more commonly 
arise in relation to reunifi cation, rather than refusal of entry 
at the border. Th is is due to the fact that when it comes to 
immigration rights deriving from the principle of family 
unity, the situation is unclear. A specifi c right to enter the 
country is not explicitly stated either in the Refugees Act or 
the Immigration Act.107
Th e nature of a genuine refugee’s fl ight from persecution 
or confl ict in their state of origin oft en means that families 
are divided. Th is happens for a number of reasons: persons 
seeking asylum oft en do not have the choice of making 
sure that the entire family is seeking asylum at the same 
time. Th is is oft en the case with confl ict in Africa, where 
the predominant number of South Africa’s refugees hail 
from. Factions may attack a village or region without warn-
ing causing people to fl ee. In the confusion, families will 
oft en lose track of each other. It is only when they are in the 
country of asylum that they are able to access the services 
or communicate through friends and family to fi nd where 
their family members have fl ed to.
Sometimes, families choose to leave their country of ori-
gin at diff erent times; one member may choose to leave due 
to the danger to their own family and thus protect them 
from persecution. Once they reach their country of refuge, 
they may then decide to bring their family to stay with them. 
Th is is oft en the case when it is the breadwinner who had to 
leave but still needs to support his or her family.
Parents may leave their children behind in the state of 
origin because they are fearful that the voyage to the state 
of refuge is fraught with dangers. It is only when they arrive 
in the state of refuge that they feel that they can access a 
government or UNHCR programme to have their children 
safely brought to join them.
Refugees may leave their families behind under the pro-
tection of other people, but those situations may change. 
Children are oft en left  with other relatives or neighbours. If 
something were to happen to those people, the child is then 
left  without any support. Th is may lead to a situation where 
it is imperative to have the children join their parents.
Th e problem however arises when dependants who fi nd 
themselves in third party states or still in their in state of 
origin request to join their family members in South Africa. 
Th ose refugees will then search for legitimate means to 
bring their families to join them legally. It is in the absence 
of legal means that people may turn to clandestine means 
of having their family members join them. Th is may lead 
to dangerous border crossings, corrupt payments of bor-
der offi  cials, and fears of large-scale smuggling cloaked as 
family reunifi cation.
For South Africa to be able to facilitate reunifi cation for 
refugees as a means to ensure the full protection of refu-
gees, it needs to lay a fi rm foundation for family unity and 
family reunifi cation in its domestic legislation. Jastram108 
confi rms that such provisions are an important method of 
implementing international standards and represent the 
best practice in a rights-based approach to protection of the 
refugee family.
In both Canada and Australia where derivative status is 
not permitted, separate administrative procedures still exist 
to ensure family unity, for example, a family sponsorship 
category within the country’s immigration regime, although 
such procedures may be cumbersome and cause pain and 
hardship to refugees seeking family reunifi cation. In light 
of this, it is suggested that South Africa should incorpor-
ate family unity and family reunifi cation into its existing 
refugee legislation as simply and as elegantly included by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Refugee status shall in principle be extended to the spouse and 
minor children as well as other dependants, if they are living in 
the same household. Entry visas shall be provided to such persons 
to whom asylum has been granted.109
Th e Refugee Act of Iraq is even more succinct, stating that 
“ … [t]he person who has been accepted as a refugee in Iraq 
shall be allowed to bring his/her family members legally 
recognised as dependants.”110
Conclusion
South Africa’s obligations in law require that it set up a sys-
tem so that otherwise law-abiding people will not turn to 
clandestine ways of reuniting with their families. In terms 
of international law and its domestic law, South Africa is 
obligated to set up a family reunifi cation process for refu-
gees in South Africa so that people are not forced to turn 
to methods which can result in violence, people smuggling, 
and further suff ering.
While the 1951 Convention remains the central docu-
ment in terms of international refugee law, at the same 
time it is acknowledged that the document does not cover 
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or deal with the range of issues facing refugees today. Th is 
paper has demonstrated how refugee law is informed by 
International Human Rights Law and how it can be used 
to supplement refugee law, thereby broadening the scope of 
the 1951 Convention and also strengthening and enhancing 
existing standards.
Despite the lack of a unifi ed approach internation-
ally, there is a clear understanding of the right to family 
unity. Th e right to family life is a clear example of protec-
tion aff orded to refugees that is inadequate under the 1951 
Convention. However other forms of international law and 
case-law provide authority that the family is an essential 
institution and indicate a clear concern both for its preser-
vation as well as its promotion.
Refugee law is without a doubt a compromise between 
the sovereignty of a state and the humanitarian needs of 
a group of people, arguably a group more vulnerable than 
any other in society. Most states, including South Africa, 
are however implementing this right more so from a sover-
eignty perspective than a protection right for families. Even 
though the right to the reunifi cation of refugee families 
cannot escape the competing interest of the individual and 
the state, it is argued that the actual family situation should 
be the ultimate determining factor if the family life is to be 
protected. It is submitted that the question of family unity 
should be considered from a positive obligation perspective 
rather than a sovereignty position and the humanistic qual-
ity in this area of law must be encouraged.
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